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This paper discusses program evaluation for ProJoven, the Peruvian youth labor 
training program. Complementing detailed fieldwork, the econometric work 
implements a two-stage matching procedure on propensity scores, gender and 
labor income. This allows identification of differentiated program impacts on 
males and females and attacks the problem of Ashenfelter’s Dips. 
 
The evaluation shows substantial differences in ProJoven’s impact for males and 
females. Eighteen months after participation in the program, employment rates for 
females improve by about 15 percent (while employment for males reduces by 11 
percent), gender occupational segregation reduces by 30 percent, and females’ 
labor income improves by 93 percent (while males’ earnings increase by 11 
percent). Nonetheless, gender equality promotion represents only 1.5 percent of 
ProJoven’s budget. These results suggest that labor-training programs that 
promote equal gender participation have disproportionately positive effects on 
outcomes for women trainees in a labor market with substantial gender 
differences. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Gender differences in the Peruvian labor market are notorious, especially among poor youth. 
Data from the 2000 National Household Survey reveal a general unemployment rate of 6.4 
percent, but the rate among the young (those under 25 years old) is 13.6 percent. For 1986–2000 
in metropolitan Lima, Ñopo (forthcoming) reports that the prevailing gender wage gap after 
controlling for observable human capital characteristics is highest among low-income individuals. 
At the bottom percentile of the income distribution, the hourly wages of men are double those of 
women. 
Such gender differences may arise because Peruvian labor markets do not provide equal 
opportunities to males and females or because opportunities are taken differently by gender. This 
paper examines that question by evaluating the impact in the largest Peruvian urban areas of 
ProJoven, a labor training program for poor youth. Evidence from the program shows that 
women who receive the opportunity to participate equally in the labor market benefit 
disproportionately more than men.  
ProJoven encourages equal participation in its training courses, especially for 
traditionally male-dominated occupations. After three months of training, beneficiaries who pass 
competency tests graduate to a three-month internship with a local firm. The program tries to 
maximize success by reducing the mismatch between training and job placement, targeting only 
those occupations with proven market demand. 
  Program results were assessed using data collected by ProJoven from a sample of 
beneficiaries and control individuals over time. Four measurements were taken: an initial 
baseline at the beginning of internships and three follow-ups at six, 12, and 18 months after 
internships were completed. The search for controls involved detailed fieldwork in which 
ProJoven prematched individuals based on a small set of characteristics (gender, age, poverty, 
education and employment status). 
When the information was collected, we performed the econometric analysis. 
Beneficiaries and controls were matched in a two-stage procedure, using the estimated 
propensity scores first and then gender and labor-income information. This allowed us to 
estimate differentiated gender impacts for ProJoven and to reduce the problem associated with 
Ashenfelter’s Dip.   5
  Literature on the gender effects of training in Latin America suggests that male workers 
benefit more than female workers from training, with the impact of training more pronounced for 
productivity than wages.
1 Our results support the latter conclusion, finding no substantial gender 
differences from training on hourly wages. However, we document important gender differences 
in outcomes for employment rates and occupational segregation. As a result, gender differences 
for the impact of training on total labor income are substantial. 
 
2.  Description of ProJoven 
 
ProJoven was created in 1996 as a pilot program sponsored by the Peruvian Ministry of Labor 
and Social Promotion. Designed to provide training and internship opportunities to young 
Peruvian workers from low-income families by promoting successful training programs 
throughout the country, the program is expected to increase average wages and employment and 
to reduce gaps for young workers between jobs. It also has taken on the major goal of increasing 
female participation in the labor market, particularly in occupations traditionally filled by males.   
The program finances the theoretical and practical training of selected beneficiaries. 
ProJoven contracts training entities, called ECAPs, to organize and offer training courses for 
which beneficiaries can enroll. ProJoven provides a structure by which ECAPs are motivated to 
design three-month training programs that match local firms’ needs with the capabilities of 
participating trainees. ECAPs also must guarantee internship opportunities for participants who 
successfully complete their coursework.  
The program targets young adults who are either unemployed or underemployed, have 
low educational levels, and come from low-income families. Individuals who meet these 
specifications are selected through an accreditation process to participate in the program.  Once 
selected, beneficiaries choose the training courses in which they want to enroll. 
ProJoven finances the training and provides a monthly stipend for trainees that covers 
transportation, meals and medical insurance. Additionally, to encourage their participation, 
women with children under the age of five receive a double stipend. Expenditures for mothers’ 
subsidies represent 6.6 percent of total stipends, or less than 1.5 percent of ProJoven’s total 
budget. When the coursework is over and tests are passed, beneficiaries intern at a firm under a 
                                                 
1 López-Acevedo (2002).   6
youth temporary training contract. Internships last for at least three months, with firms paying 
interns a stipend at least equal to the minimum wage.  
Since its inception, ProJoven has trained seven classes totaling 20,000 young workers 
through more than 240 training entities offering 1,027 courses. In its sixth class, ProJoven 
trained 3,610 youth individuals during 2000 in the five cities outlined in Table 1.  
                                           
Table 1.ProJoven Beneficiaries by City 
 
   Participants 
Percent of 
trainees 
Arequipa 400  11.1 
Chiclayo 155 4.3 
Lima 2,583  71.6 
Cusco 127  3.5 
Trujillo 345  9.6 
Total 3,610  100 
 
 




Information was first collected in early March 2002, when the sixth class began.
2 ProJoven 
designed a detailed process to collect data to evaluate the impact of its training on beneficiaries. 
First, individuals were selected using a stratified sampling method. Sampling was done 
independently in each city according to the following four categories: females aged 16 to 20, 
females aged 21 to 25, males aged 16 to 20 and males aged 21 to 25.  ProJoven representatives 
interviewed each sample enrollee using a questionnaire to elicit information about family 
income, previous training experience, educational level and labor history.  
After collecting information on beneficiaries, ProJoven began to search for individuals to 
form a control group. The first criterion for controls was geographic. For each beneficiary 
ProJoven attempted to locate a control who lived nearby, preferably on the same block. This was 
done to increase the probability that beneficiaries and controls participated in the same labor 
market and had an equal opportunity to participate in the program. The second set of criteria 
included individual and familial characteristics. Controls and beneficiaries were paired by the 
following criteria: 
                                                 
2 A class indicates a new group of beneficiaries selected to begin the training program.   7
•  Having the same gender; 
•  Being within one year of age of each other;  
•  Belonging to families whose poverty level, measured in part by an ad hoc scale 
constructed by ProJoven, differed by no more than five points;  
•  Having schooling levels that differed by no more than one academic year;  
•  Having the same employment status (employed, unemployed, underemployed by 
earnings, underemployed by hours, inactive, discouraged, or newcomer); 
•  Having a reported monthly income, for a principal activity as well as any secondary 
activity, that did not differ by more than 100 soles; and  
•  Having children whose number did not differ by more than one.  
 
When a control candidate satisfied these criteria, he/she was interviewed using the same 
questionnaire given to beneficiaries. ProJoven collected information for more than 1,000 
beneficiaries and more than 3,000 controls to amass baseline data. For program evaluation, 
ProJoven then surveyed all individuals from the beneficiary and control samples at three 
intervals—six, 12, and 18 months after the sample class had completed its internships.   
To alleviate the problem of attrition during the course of the surveys, ProJoven maintained a 
reserve group of beneficiaries and controls that were also interviewed but whose information was 
used only to replace data from individuals who did not complete the whole battery of 
measurements. If an individual from the sample could not be located for a follow-up interview, 
she/he was replaced with an individual from the reserve group with similar observable 
characteristics. The main source of attrition was migration, either national or international. When 
an individual moved to another location within the same city, ProJoven tried to locate the 
individual and apply the follow-up survey before turning to a replacement from the backup group.  
The distribution by city of the samples of beneficiaries and controls, without considering 
the reserve group of beneficiaries, is shown in Table 2. With these samples of beneficiaries and 
controls collected by ProJoven, we proceeded to perform the econometric matching. 
 
   8
Table 2.Sample Sizes by City for Beneficiaries and Controls 
 
   Controls  Beneficiaries 
Arequipa 293  205 
Chiclayo 193  122 
Lima 364  368 
Cusco 190  117 
Trujillo 494  202 
    
Total 1,534  1,014 
 
 
3.2 The Econometric Work 
We performed the econometric analysis on ProJoven’s sample of beneficiaries and controls. The 
matching involved two steps: the preselection of control candidates (based on propensity scores) 
and the final selection (based on average hourly wages). The propensity scores were estimated 
for each city using the following variables:  
•  Gender 
•  Age  
•  Experience 
•  Schooling achievement 
•  Type of school (public or private) 
•  Previous training  
•  Marital status 
•  A dummy variable valued at 1 if the individual had children 
•  A dummy variable to indicate whether the individual did or did not have secondary jobs  
•  Mothers’ schooling 
•  Poverty of individuals’ households  
•  Employment status during the previous three months 
•  Average hourly wages during the previous three months.  
  
Having estimated the propensities for each beneficiary, we preselected all the individuals 
in the control group with a propensity score that differed by no more than 0.05 from the score of 
their corresponding beneficiary. That is, we set a caliper of 0.05 for the matching on propensities.   9
Among those who were preselected, we picked the three individuals with the same gender and 
the closest average logarithm of hourly wages as the beneficiary. Finally, we averaged the three 
chosen controls by applying a uniform kernel to their observable characteristics. It is important 
to note that the average wages of the last three months was also an explanatory variable in the 
estimation of propensity scores. We included it to avoid the possibility of omitted variable biases 
in the estimation of propensity scores.  
The theoretical basis for the two-step matching procedure in the analysis is illustrated in 
Figure 1. The sets of observable characteristics included in the matching score estimation are n-
dimensional. Let us consider the projection of that space into two dimensions whose base is the 
set of characteristics x1 and x2. Points in the two-dimensional space represent the projections of 
the observations for beneficiaries and controls as the iso-propensity lines shown below represent 
the projections of the iso-propensity hyperplanes.  
The beneficiary A lies on an iso-propensity that is close enough to the iso-propensity for 
the control B (or, equivalently, their propensity scores are close enough). If comparing solely the 
propensity scores would do the matching, A-B could be a good match. But this neglects the 
possibility of better matches. The boxed neighborhoods of the beneficiary A and the control B 
contain other beneficiaries and controls that not only have similar propensity scores, but also 
have smaller differences in the actual observable matching variables x1 and x2. Combining the 
notions of propensity scores and nearest neighbors (on the space of characteristics, not in the 
propensity scores) promises to deliver better matches.  
 
   10




We combined the notions of matching on propensities and nonparametric nearest 
neighbors to produce a matched sample with smaller differences in observable characteristics ex 
ante. The second step in the matching criterion had a dual purpose: to reduce the presence of 
Ashenfelter’s Dip
3 in the evolution of beneficiaries’ labor income and to allow differentiation of 
program impacts by gender. Figures 2a and 2b show density functions for the propensity scores 
for beneficiaries and controls before and after matching. Note the complete overlap of the 
beneficiaries’ and controls’ supports for the propensity scores. The effectiveness of matching is 




                                                 
3 Ashenfelter (1978) pointed out that in this type of training program, beneficiaries’ earnings are affected negatively 
prior to entering the program. See Heckman and Smith (1999) for additional details. Specific to ProJoven, some 
beneficiaries chose to reduce hours worked to free up time to complete the application process, while others stopped 
working in anticipation of being admitted to training.    11
Figure 2a.Density Functions for the Estimated Propensities of Being a Beneficiary, 
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Finally since the distribution of matched beneficiaries by city does not necessarily reflect 
the distribution of all beneficiaries, expansion factors were applied to the matched observations 
to convert the sample into one that is representative of the whole beneficiary population. As a 
result, the expanded sample of matched beneficiaries and controls shows average characteristics 
that, being similar to each other, are also similar to the characteristics of the beneficiary 
population. Some basic characteristics are explored next. Since 52 percent of beneficiaries are 
females, the analysis sample corresponds (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Distribution by Sex (Expanded Matched Sample) 
 




Male                   50.6        48.2   48 
Female                   49.4    51.8   52 
Total                 100.0  100.0  100 
 
Moreover, the employment status of the samples of matched beneficiaries and controls 
are similar. Figure 3 depicts the distributions of employment status for both groups. 
 
Figure 3.Beneficiaries and Controls by Employment Status 
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The second step in the matching procedure was designed to reduce the differences in 
labor income that existed between beneficiaries and controls prior to implementation of ProJoven. 
While the original samples of beneficiaries and controls reveal higher earnings for the latter, the 
gap is reduced in the expanded matched sample. For hourly wages, the average difference 
between beneficiaries and controls is around six centimes of a Nuevo Sol, representing 
approximately 5 percent of the beneficiaries’ average payment rate. These results are reported in 
Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Monthly Earnings and Hourly Wages  
for Beneficiaries and Controls at the Baseline 
 
   Monthly Earnings  Hourly Wages 
   Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Controls (original sample)  252.80  165.61  1.41  0.98 
Controls (matched sample)  216.83  144.04  1.10  0.67 
Controls (expanded matched sample)  228.13  157.46  1.14  0.72 
Beneficiaries (original sample)  165.09  144.22  1.03  0.82 
Beneficiaries (matched sample)  172.93  145.89  1.05  0.76 
Beneficiaries (expanded matched
sample) 175.97  149.05  1.08  0.75 
 
4. Results   
 
The impact of ProJoven on labor market outcomes was measured for four aspects: labor supply 
(measured by employment rates and hours worked), income (measured by hourly wages and 
monthly earnings), occupational segregation by gender (measured by the Duncan Index
4) and 
other effects. The impact estimators we report are computed as differences-in-differences.
5   
For the three months for which there are measurements we have information about 
individuals’ primary and secondary jobs. In addition, participants were asked to record their 
labor situation (including employment status, occupation, hours worked and wage) for the 
primary occupation for the periods between interviews. Whenever possible, we report the 
                                                 
4  This index measures the degree to which males and females concentrate in male- and female-dominated 
occupations, respectively. It ranges from 0 to 1, in which a value close to 0 denotes no segregation and a value close 
to 1 reveals full segregation. 
5 Differences between matched beneficiaries and control individuals are computed on the baseline and are compared 
with the observable differences recorded six, 12 and 18 months after completing the program.   14
development of labor variables for the beneficiaries and the corresponding control individuals for 
the 33 months in which data were collected. 
 
4.1 The Impact on Labor Supply  
Since a main objective of ProJoven is to facilitate the process of participants entering the labor 




The impact of ProJoven on the unemployment rate is negative for the first two measurements (at 
the 6- and 12-month marks after program completion), although the difference is very close to 
zero. After 18 months there is a positive impact on the employment rate as can be seen in Table 5. 
The estimated ProJoven impact is 3.24 percent in the employment rate.
6  
 
Table 5. Impact on Employment Rates of Trainees vs. Controls (in percent) 
 
   Baseline  6 months  12 months  18 months 
Controls 57.9  65.3  66.2  64.6 
Beneficiaries 59.1  64.8  65.6  69.1 
ProJoven Impact               –1.74           –1.87     3.24 
 
Detailed monthly data provides better information about the labor effects of the program 
on individual beneficiaries and controls. The vertical lines in Figure 4 refer to critical moments 
in the sixth class’s development: the baseline (November 1999), the beginning of the training 
courses (February 2000), the end of training (October 2000), the sixth-month measurement (May 
2001), the twelfth-month measurement (November 2001) and the 18-month measurement (May 
2002). However, it should be noted that the data points at times other than the survey times may 
suffer from recall bias. 
 
                                                 
6 This and all the remaining impact estimators are diff-in-diff. For instance the impact estimator after six months is 
obtained from (64.8-59.1)-(65.3-57.9).   15

























































































































































































































The employment rates for beneficiaries and controls coincided at the baseline. After the 
training period, the employment rate of beneficiaries was below that for the controls. When 
beneficiaries began their internships, their employment rate rose to 70 percent but inched down 
to 65 percent during the months following the program.  
Although ProJoven’s overall impact on employment is positive only after 18 months, it 
produces important gender differences (Table 6). As a result of their participation in the program, 
females achieved insertion into more jobs than males. The 5.96 percent increase in female 
employment 12 months after program completion and the 15.2 percent increase after 18 months 
can be attributed to the women’s participation in ProJoven (Table 6).  
    
Table 6. Impact on Gender Employment Rates (in Percent) 
Gender  6 months  12 months  18 months 
Females  –2.45      5.96    15.20 





Even though ProJoven’s overall impact on the extensive margin of the labor supply (measured 
by employment rates) was close to zero, the impact on the intensive margin (measured by hours 
worked) was positive (Table 7 and Figure 5).
7  
                                                 
7 The percentage impact estimators are obtained from the diff-in-diff estimator explained in footnote 6, computed as 
percentage of the average value for beneficiaries at the baseline.   16
 
Table 7.  Impact on Hours Worked (Main and Secondary Occupations) 
 
   Baseline  6 months  12 months  18 months 
Controls 48.31  54.30  60.13  57.98 
Beneficiaries 40.88  54.09 55.83 53.83 
ProJoven Impact    17.7%  7.7%  8.0% 
 
 







































































































































































































































Although ProJoven did not substantially increase the participants’ employment rate,   
beneficiaries did increase their weekly hours worked (Table 8). Consequently, the program had a 
positive impact on weekly and monthly earnings. The breakdown of this impact by gender 
reveals a larger effect on males. 
 
Table 8. Impact on Hours Worked by Gender (in Percent) 
 
Gender  6 months  12 months  18 months 
Females  13.42  10.42    5.73 
Males 21.86   9.73 14.64 
   17
4.2 Impact on Earnings 
Hourly Wages 
The impact of ProJoven on the hourly wages of young beneficiaries is positive, and it slightly 
increases during the period of analysis, as can be seen in Table 9.  
 
Table 9. Impact on Hourly Wages (Main and Secondary Occupations) 
 
  Baseline  6 months  12 months 
18 
months 
Controls S/.1.14  S/.1.42  S/.1.35  S/.1.40 
Beneficiaries S/.1.08 S/.1.48  S/.1.46  S/.1.54 
ProJoven Impact    11.1%  15.7%  18.5% 
 
Next we show the evolution of the beneficiaries’ and controls’ average hourly wages 
from their main occupations.  The impact of ProJoven in the sixth month is negative, however at 
the twelfth and eighteenth month it is positive (see Figure 6). 
 






























































































































































































































Table 10 shows gender differences in ProJoven’s impact on hourly wages. After the 
twelfth month, males are benefiting more than females. However, at the sixth and eighteenth 
months, gender differences in income per hour are minor. 
   18
Table 10. Impact on Hourly Wages by Gender (in Percent) 
Gender  6 months  12 months  18 months 
Females  10.83    5.03  19.99 




ProJoven’s effect on average monthly earnings is obtained by adding the monetary value of the 
effect from number of hours worked to the effect on hourly wages. ProJoven has a positive 
impact on both variables, which are also positively correlated. Consequently, the aggregate effect 
is greater than what would be obtained from a simple aggregation of the individual effects. The 
impact of ProJoven at the sixth month reaches 48 percent of average monthly earnings (Table 
11). The impact reduces by the eighteenth month to a still-noticeable 30 percent. 
 
Table 11. Impact on Average Monthly Earnings (Main and Secondary Occupations) 
 
   Baseline  6 months  12 months 
18 
months 
Controls S/.228.13  S/.285.95  S/.319.30  S/.330.02
Beneficiaries S/.175.97  S/.325.50  S/.330.92  S/.333.72
ProJoven Impact    52.1%  36.2%  31.7% 
 
  The evolution of average monthly earnings of beneficiaries and controls also reveals a 
positive, if limited, effect on the average monthly earnings of program participants (Figure 7). 
The beneficial effects only relate to the primary occupation and in fact disappear during the last 
five months of measurement. 
   19





























































































































































































































The impact of ProJoven on aggregate labor income incorporates the effects on individual 
labor income and employment, as shown in Table 12. At the baseline, it is estimated that the 
expanded sample of beneficiaries generated S/. 375,558, while the expanded sample of controls 
generated S/. 476,646. Six months after program completion, the total labor income of 
beneficiaries grew to S/. 761,918, while the controls earned S/. 674,486. This implies a positive 
effect of almost 50 percent  (see footnotes 6 and 7) over beneficiary baseline income.  
 
Table 12. Impact on Total Monthly Earnings (Main and Secondary Occupations) 
   Baseline  6 months  12 months  18 months
Controls  S/. 476,646  S/. 674,486  S/. 763,629  S/. 766,668
Beneficiaries  S/. 375,558  S/. 761,918  S/. 783,860  S/. 832,423
ProJoven Impact    50.2%  32.3%  44.4% 
 
Table 13 shows the gender breakdown of ProJoven’s impact on monthly earnings, 
revealing substantial gains for females. After 18 months, beneficiary females generate 92.88 
percent more labor income than their control counterparts. Also, while the impact on males 
diminishes over time after graduation, the effect for females does not vanish and seems to 
increase.  
   20
Table 13. Impact on Total Monthly Earnings by Gender (in Percent) 
 
Gender  6 months  12 months  18 months 
Females 46.57  49.70  92.88 
Males 41.31 17.38  10.92 
 
 
4.3 Impact on Occupational Segregation 
 
ProJoven has been able to reduce occupational segregation among its targeted population. The 
program encourages training entities to focus on increasing female worker participation in the 
labor market, especially in occupations with a high prevalence of male workers. Women trainees 
who had been working in occupations traditionally filled by females, or who were previously 
unemployed, subsequently found jobs in occupations traditionally filled by males. Important 
changes can be documented in the percentages of female participation in three occupational 
groups: sales personnel, restaurant and food service workers, and domestic workers.  As a result 
of participation in ProJoven, the levels of occupational segregation, measured by the Duncan 
Index,
8 diminished noticeably among the beneficiaries.  
 
Table 14. Occupational Segregation by Gender before and after ProJoven 
(Duncan Index) 
 
   Baseline  6 months  12 months 18 months 
Controls 0.681 0.610  0.638  0.732 
Beneficiaries 0.626  0.467  0.508  0.461 
 
 
Bootstrapping the estimation of the distribution of such Duncan Indexes assures that the changes 
in occupational segregation are significantly positive. Changes in the occupational structures of 
beneficiaries do not weaken after eighteen months. In fact, the effect is accentuated slightly as 
illustrated by Figure 8. Note that the distributions of the index for beneficiaries and controls 
separate from each other. 
 
                                                 
8 The Duncan Index is a measure of occupational segregation. It attains values on the interval [0, 1], where an index 
of 0 reflects no segregation (males and females are equally distributed across occupations) and 1 reflects complete 
segregation (some occupations are only for males and others only for females). The Duncan Index can be interpreted 
as the percentage of the female working force that would have to switch from female-dominated to male-dominated 
jobs to achieve an equal distribution of males and females across occupations.   21
Figure 8. Density Functions for the Duncan Index 
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4.4 Other Effects 
 
Apart from the effects that ProJoven has had on trainees’ employment status, earnings and 
occupational segregation, other variables related to the working conditions and the well-being of 
its beneficiaries should be discussed. Indeed, ProJoven graduates experienced positive changes 
Twelve months after 
ProJoven 
Eighteen months after 
ProJoven   22
in the characteristics of the firms that hire them, the type of job contracts they receive, workplace 
conditions and reduction of secondary activities.  
ProJoven training and apprenticeships led beneficiaries toward work in larger firms. Prior 
to joining the program, 11.76 percent of individuals were working in firms with 21 employees or 
more, while 36.22 percent are so employed six months after having completed their 
apprenticeships, a level that is maintained at the 12-month and 18-month marks.  
The percentage of individuals working under permanent or temporary contracts also 
increases after leaving ProJoven, indicating better working conditions for program beneficiaries. 
At the baseline, 13.9 percent of enrollees were working under one of these contract types, 
compared to 43.4 percent six months after completion of the program and 46.8 percent and 56.3 
percent after twelve and eighteen months, respectively.  
We also observe changes in place of employment. After completing the program, 
beneficiaries tend to stop working at home or the homes of friends and begin working at firms. 
These changes are more pronounced for the trainee sample than for the control group. Before 
participation in ProJoven, 35.2 percent of beneficiaries worked in formal places compared to 
65.3 percent afterwards.  
Finally, ProJoven has positively affected the percentage of workers who have secondary 
jobs and the number of hours devoted to each occupation. At the base line, 11.31 percent of 
participants had a secondary occupation compared with 4.38 percent after completing the 
program. Moreover, the differences-in-differences estimator shows that beneficiaries reduced the 
number of hours devoted to secondary occupations by 70 percent by the sixth-month mark and 
by 46 percent at the 18-month mark.  
   23
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper provides evidence that a training program promoting gender equality has 
disproportionately higher impact for females than for males. ProJoven promotes equal gender 
participation in its training courses and generates incentives for young women with children to 
participate by providing special subsidies. As a result, ProJoven improves the employment rate 
of females more than males; and female trainees find their way in the labor market in a less 
segregated way. Program participants also work more hours per week after their training, 
although this result is more typical for males than females. The program positively impacts 
hourly wages, without gender differences. The combined effects (employment status, 
occupational field, hours worked and hourly wages), which are reflected in the total labor income 
of participants, is positive overall, but substantially higher for females than for males.  
The paper also demonstrates the practicality of applying a nonexperimental program 
evaluation design that combines political feasibility and statistical soundness. The political 
feasibility of implementing the model stems from the absence of need to perform any random 
assignment of individuals to the beneficiary and control groups (an activity that policymakers are 
always reluctant to undertake). On the other hand, it requires detailed fieldwork, complemented 
with propensity score matching. Statistically, the differences in observable characteristics 
between the beneficiary and control groups are smaller than those that would be obtained with a 
traditional procedure. If the unobservable characteristics of individuals in both groups were 
correlated to observable characteristics, the performance of the estimators obtained with this 
procedure could be comparable to the performance of estimators obtained with experimental 
frameworks. However, this is a conditional assessment. The way to guarantee a proper 
construction of treatment and control groups is through a randomized assignment. 
 
   24
References 
Ashenfelter, Orley. 1978. “Estimating the Effect of Training Programs on Earnings.” Review of 
Economics and Statistics  6(1): 47–57. 
Heckman, James, Hidehiko Ichimura, and Petra Todd. 1997. “Matching as an Econometric 
Evaluation Estimator: Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Program.” Review of 
Economics Studies 65: 261–94. 
Heckman, James, and Jeffrey Smith. 1999. “The Pre-Program Earnings Dip and the 
Determinants of Participation in a Social Program: Implications for Simple Program 
Evaluation Strategies.” Working Paper 6983. National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: http://www.nber.org/papers/w6983 
Heckman, James, Robert LaLonde, and Jeffrey Smith. 1998. “The Economics and Econometrics 
of Active Labor Market Programs.” In Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, Eds. 
Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. III.  
Lopez-Acevedo, Gladys. 2002. “Wages and Productivity in Mexican Manufacturing.” 
Mimeographed document. The World Bank (LCSPE), Mexico. 
Ñopo, Hugo. (Forthcoming). “Matching as a Tool to Decompose Wage Gaps.”  Review of 
Economics and Statistics. 
Ñopo, Hugo, Miguel Robles, and Jaime Saavedra. 2002. “Una Medición del Impacto del 
Programa de Capacitación Laboral Juvenil ProJoven.” Working Paper 36. Lima, Peru: 
Grupo de Análisis para el Desarrollo (GRADE).    25
 
Appendix: Estimation of the Propensities to Participate at ProJoven by City 
 
Variables Arequipa  Chiclayo  Lima  Cusco  Trujillo 
Log of hourly wage   0.037  –0.022  0.008  0.036  –0.000 
     (2.75)**  (0.74)  (0.58)      (2.96)**  (0.02) 
Male = 1      –0.216  –0.011  –0.036  –0.008  0.096 
 (1.91)  (0.08)  (0.40)  (0.05)  (0.90) 
Age   0.022  0.046  –0.001  0.126  0.021 
 (0.87)  (1.23)  (0.03)      (3.36)**  (0.93) 
Tenure  (weeks)      –0.001  –0.002  –0.001  –0.001  –0.002 
  (0.54)  (1.63)    (2.16)*  (0.82)      (3.00)** 
Finished High-School = 1   0.110  0.039  –0.080  –0.438  –0.104 
 (0.70)  (0.20)  (0.70)     (2.24)*  (0.96) 
Went to a public school = 1   0.177  0.088  –0.205  –0.262  –0.133 
 (0.75)  (0.26)  (0.96)  (1.23)  (0.82) 
Took vocational training = 1   0.098  0.807  0.183  0.516  0.215 
  (0.88)    (2.36)*  (1.87)      (3.17)**  (1.76) 
Single = 1   0.700  0.689  0.488  0.745  0.463 
     (3.31)**  (1.90)      (3.15)**     (2.53)*     (2.52)* 
Has children = 1      –0.228  0.138  –0.147  –0.320  0.130 
 (1.14)  (0.40)  (1.00)  (1.07)  (0.71) 
Has a secondary job = 1    1.093  1.094  0.910  0.513  1.240 
     (6.06)**       (2.74)**     (4.36)**  (1.52)      (6.01)** 
Mother w/ college degree = 1   0.183  0.393  0.869  0.905  0.763 
  (0.53)  (1.28)      (3.38)**      (2.86)**     (2.47)* 
Poverty score      –0.018  0.067  0.016  –0.012  0.007 
  (1.32)      (3.18)** (1.24)  (0.44)  (0.41) 
Log of the average hourly 
wage during the last three 
months 
    –0.131  –0.104  –0.114  –0.043  –0.224 
     (2.67)**  (1.06)      (2.70)**  (0.85)     (2.23)* 
EEE   0.938  0.211  0.797 –0.295  1.664 
     (2.80)**  (0.32)      (2.72)**  (0.83)     (2.46)* 
EUE   1.078  0.475  1.113    1.609 
     (2.66)**  (0.61)     (2.46)*       (2.33)* 
EEU   0.660  0.412  0.822  0.431  1.728 
  (1.69)  (0.61)     (2.53)*  (0.78)     (2.48)* 
EUU   1.139  1.093  0.576  0.547  1.813 
   (2.52)*  (1.41)  (1.67)  (1.01)      (2.64)** 
UUE   0.702  0.542  0.818  –0.084  1.552 
  (1.73)  (0.76)     (2.37)*  (0.17)     (2.19)* 
UEE 0.777  0.366  0.623  1.285  1.674 
 (1.83)  (0.52)  (1.70)     (2.20)*     (2.31)* 
UEU   1.392  0.813  –0.212    1.643 
     (2.60)**  (0.79) (0.32)   (1.82) 
Constant     –2.752  –3.987  –1.579  –3.131  –3.317 
     (3.79)**      (3.26)**      (2.68)**      (3.33)**      (3.57)** 
Observations 834  481  1,012  464  1,019 
Pseudo R
2 0.12  0.11  0.07  0.17  0.08 
              Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses. *Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%. 
 